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As of this writing, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are in their eighth and tenth years, having accrued
nearly a trillion dollars in direct military costs. I review the history of cost forecasts for these ongoing
engagements, highlighting the differences across them in scope and accuracy, assessing the methods
and practice of cost forecasting, and exploring the implications of the war costs themselves. Besides
the unanticipated length and breadth of the military conflicts themselves, a related and equally important
component of costs is the life cycle of costs associated with caring for veterans. The forecasts we have
of such costs imply high levels of public spending per veteran and very high levels of costs associated
with pain and suffering per veteran, as high as 10 to 25 percent of lifetime wealth. I also discuss the
methods and motivations associated with war cost forecasts by comparing them with other types of
aggregate forecasts, which are prone to similar types of errors. The history of war cost forecasts suggests
that increasing their frequency and transparency may improve their usefulness in guiding policy.
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redwards@qc.cuny.eduAs of the summer of 2010, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were entering their eighth
and tenth years respectively. The cumulative total in direct military costs associated with
these conﬂicts exceeded $750 billion in the summer of 2009 (Belasco, 2009) and has likely
reached $800 billion based on trends in monthly spending. Reductions in force strength are
currently underway in Iraq, but troop levels have surged in Afghanistan and are likely to
remain high at least through the summer of 2011. One notable study estimated that the
total present value of all present and future costs associated with these wars might ultimately
exceed three trillion dollars (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008), but other studies of costs have oﬀered
a wide range of estimates (Nordhaus, 2002; Wallsten and Kosec, 2005; Bilmes and Stiglitz,
2006; Bilmes, 2007; Sunshine, 2007; Goldberg, 2007; Tanielian and Jaycox, 2008; Davis,
Murphy and Topel, 2009). I list these studies and a subset of their forecasts in Table 1. In
this paper, I review the sources of diﬀerences across these forecasts and explore implications
for the methods and practice of war cost forecasting. I also assess the relative magnitude of
present and future war costs in Iraq and Afghanistan
Military actions are costly in many ways for a wide variety of groups, and accurate
cost forecasts are important for informing policy. From an economic perspective, assessing
the costs of warfare relative to its beneﬁts should be a central component of the decision to
engage in warfare. Still, some scholars argue that warfare is an inherently irrational outcome
whose costs tend to exceed the beneﬁts, even to those who win (Tuchman, 1984; Gartzke,
1999). But even if war cost forecasts do not appreciably aﬀect policy making, they are still
useful for assessing well-being.
Important characteristics of any cost forecast are the geographic and temporal domains
over which costs are measured. A forecast of all direct U.S. military costs of actions in Iraq
and Afghanistan would include only the funds required to deploy and maintain troops and
equipment for the length of deployment. It would omit many other overt budgetary costs
such as those associated with compensation for U.S. veterans’ disability and death. Another
forecast domain might encompass all the incurred liabilities of the U.S. federal government,
2regardless of what form they take, from the beginning of the military action through to
the indeﬁnite future. A third domain might cover costs borne by all U.S. individuals and
institutions, over all periods of time. A fourth could add individuals and institutions in
Iraq and Afghanistan or in other aﬀected countries. Cost domains often diﬀer dramatically
across estimates, which restricts comparability. The largest extant cost estimate of $3 trillion
(Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008) covers one of the broadest domains. Rather than representing just
one or two years’ worth of costs, it is a sum of all future costs.1 The estimate is also broad
in the sense that the authors attempt to measure all of the costs associated with the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan that are borne by U.S. individuals, institutions, and governments,
rather than just the direct military costs alone.
In the sections that follow, I discuss in greater detail this estimate and other extant
cost forecasts, comparing and contrasting their domains and assumptions. Then I assess
the relative size of these costs, comparing them with other government obligations, with our
means to pay them, and with the population of veterans who bear the private costs. Finally,
I provide a discussion of the methods and accuracy of war cost forecasting before concluding
with a summary of my ﬁndings.
The Attribution, Timing, and Scope of War Costs
There are two important and largely separate dimensions of war costs: the life cycle, or
temporal nature of costs; and the scope or breadth of costs across individuals aﬀected by
warfare. Extant forecasts often diﬀer across both dimensions. Of the two, the long life cycle
of some types of costs, namely the costs associated with treating and compensating wounded
veterans, is less well understood and is an often overlooked element of costs associated with
warfare. It can also be diﬃcult to attribute such costs to war per se, especially because the
1Future costs are expressed in terms of their present value, or the dollar amount that could be invested
today at typical market rates so that after accumulating interest, it would equal the future amount. Measured
this way, the present value of total costs is the dollar amount that the government would have to place in
an investment account today in order to pay oﬀ all future costs.
3life cycle of veterans’ costs can be long.
Attributing Costs to War
Formally identifying costs as attributable to warfare requires specifying a counterfactual:
had there been no wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, how much lower would costs have been?
The answer is most clear in the case of deployment-related military spending, which would
not have occurred without the deployment. It is somewhat less clear for military spend-
ing unrelated to deployment, since it may have occurred even without the conﬂict, though
probably in a lesser amount.
In the case of a combat-related injury, it is clear that without a war, and thus without the
injury, its cost probably would have been zero.2 The system of VA disability compensation is
designed to identify and measure the severity of combat-related injuries in order to reimburse
the veteran accordingly, to a degree which I discuss in a later section. But a large component
of publicly provided health beneﬁts for veterans is the routine health care associated with
aging. Had the veteran not served, regardless of whether the war occurred or not, these
routine costs would have been borne by the public through Medicare, or by the veteran
through private insurance.3 Such routine health care costs should not be counted as part
of war costs because they would have occurred in any event. In practice, however, it is
diﬃcult to decompose VA health spending into parts that are attributable to aging versus
wartime service (Orszag, 2008b). Studies focusing on the costs of particular war-related
conditions could inform such a decomposition, but they are rare and limited enough that
2It is possible that some war-zone characteristics could actually improve some characteristics of the risk
environment faced by soldiers, but it is unlikely the improvements would ever outweigh the heightened risk of
combat-related injury and death in an active war zone. Buzzell and Preston (2007) ﬁnd that among troops
in Iraq between 2003 and 2006, death rates from non-combat violent deaths were more than 25 percent lower
than those faced by U.S. civilians at similar ages and sex. Death rates from disease were almost two-third
lower among troops in Iraq. But mortality risks from combat outweighed these beneﬁcial eﬀects, resulting
in a total mortality rate for troops that was three times as high as for comparable civilians. Although it
is conceivable that the net cost of warfare could actually be negative if combat-related injuries and deaths
were somehow rare enough relative to any improvement in the risk environment, such a scenario is unlikely.
3If the comparison is between Medicare or the VA paying for care, there is probably little diﬀerence in
the quantity and total cost of medical care. There could be a diﬀerence for any care utilized before the age
of 65, which is probably less subsidized and therefore lower outside the VA.
4broader surveys of war-related spending are often unable to strike a ﬁne distinction between
war-related and other treatments. As a result, aggregate estimates of the net costs of warfare
may be biased upward if war results in unmeasured cost shifting, such as out of Medicare
and into the system of VA health beneﬁts.
One way to address such confounding is to compare wartime against peacetime spending.
Under current law, veterans receive old-age health care in both scenarios, so the diﬀerence
between them should reﬂect care and beneﬁts associated with warfare. In a companion
paper, I examine historical levels of government spending associated with military outlays
and veterans’ beneﬁts, and I can compare them across wartime and peacetime (Edwards,
2010). Results suggest that the present value of aggregate veterans’ costs typically rises by
about a factor of 10 during wartime, owing to a roughly four-fold increase in force strength
combined with average beneﬁts that are about 2.5 times higher. Direct military spending
appears to increase about 25 percent during wartime.
The Life Cycle of Costs
The diﬃculty of attributing costs of veterans’ health beneﬁts and compensation to warfare
speaks to the long life cycle of war-related costs, far past the end of hostilities. While
armed conﬂicts can last many years, their impacts will extend far beyond the period of the
conﬂict because of the impacts on veterans, their families, and communities. Even if the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan were to end tomorrow, capping direct military costs immediately,
cumulative war costs would continue to rise over time because there are several ways in which
war costs are persistent or semi-permanent in modern societies. Put simply, the human
burdens associated with warfare range from permanent to semi-permanent over the lifetimes
of combatants, their families, and other people who are directly aﬀected. Combat-related
wounds are the clearest example of burdens that may be permanent during the remaining life
of the aﬄicted individual. But an array of research ﬁndings suggests that combat exposure
and deployment have many other long-reaching and long-lasting eﬀects on human outcomes
5(Institute of Medicine, 2010; MacLean, 2010).
As discussed in a recent report by the Institute of Medicine (2010), trends in publicly
provided veterans’ health and disability beneﬁts illustrate how such costs of war are relatively
long-lived. In a companion paper (Edwards, 2010), I examine the life cycle of costs for major
U.S. wars from the beginning of the republic. Aggregate payments of beneﬁts to veterans of
a particular war typically follow an inverted U-shape over time, beginning low before rising
and reaching a peak, then tapering oﬀ somewhat more quickly. This pattern is depicted in
Figure 1, which plots total real dollars of disability compensation, pensions, and survivors’
beneﬁts for each of four cohorts of wartime veterans between 1950 and 1992, ending with
the Vietnam cohort. Spending on beneﬁts for the World War II cohort have been the
largest overall, and they peaked in 1972 and again in 1980, or roughly 30 years after the
end of hostilities. Spending on the World War I cohort, currently the second highest on
record, peaked in 1965, almost 50 years after the end of that war. The long right tail in
veterans’ beneﬁts is especially visible for the World War I cohort, which must have been
largely extinct by 1992, and yet was still drawing almost $1 billion annually, presumably in
survivors’ beneﬁts. For veterans of the Korean Conﬂict, spending had basically plateaued by
1980 and remained stable, although at a considerably lower level. Spending on the Vietnam
cohort was still rising in these data.
Veterans’ costs must ultimately decline because of rising mortality in any cohort. The
more interesting dynamic is the growth in total costs prior to the peak, after which the force
of increasing mortality must exceed the components of growth in beneﬁts. The latter include
the determinants of per capita need within the pool of veterans receiving beneﬁts, and the
determinants of the size of the pool itself. It turns out that both are important.
Cohorts of war veterans obviously cannot increase in size following the end of the conﬂict,
and physical war injuries tend to be either overt or emerging rather than latent. As a result,
one might expect that head counts of veterans on disability rolls should only decrease over
time. Figure 2 depicts time series of the number of veterans on disability and pension rolls by
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inverted U-shaped path followed by total beneﬁts spending in Figure 1, and the time elapsed
between the end of the conﬂict and the peak head count is roughly the same. The rate of
decline through age appears to be faster in head counts than in total spending, apparently
because real dollars per capita is still rising even when mortality is accelerating. Veterans’
disability beneﬁts are designed to replace foregone earnings (Institute of Medicine, 2007;
Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008), and thus are presumably indexed to real wages rather than to
inﬂation alone.4 Again, the more interesting dynamic is in the build-up to the peak.
The rise in program participation through age within a veteran cohort may reﬂect any
combination of variety of factors, relatively little about which is currently known. Some
health impacts of military service may initially be latent, revealing themselves only much
later through the natural course of aging, although that is not the case with most physical
injuries nor with psychopathologies. It is also possible that injured veterans may not initially
seek treatment that does not greatly impair their functioning, but seek treatment only when
it becomes burdensome. Some injured veterans may distrust the VA system and try to avoid
it as long as possible. Other veterans may not at ﬁrst fully understand their entitlements
to beneﬁts. Bottlenecks in the VA system could contribute to rising usage rates over time
within cohorts, if those bottlenecks were persistent rather than relatively brief. It could
also be the case that there are service members who earn disability ratings but also remain
on active duty, collecting pensions and disability beneﬁts only upon separation many years
after the conﬂict. Any of these factors could be contributing to increases in the number of
veterans receiving beneﬁts within a particular cohort.
Figure 3 plots a hypothetical example of aggregate spending on veterans from a single
4In the case of health treatments, which are separate from pensions and compensation and thus not
included in Figure 1, costs per veteran in the VA health system would rise naturally with age because
older individuals are more likely to suﬀer from multiple conditions that require intervention. The period
immediately before death is the most costly (Lubitz and Riley, 1993; Miller, 2001). Rising costs of medical
treatment over time would also contribute to increases in per capita costs. The annual growth in average
health spending has exceeded the growth in average incomes by 2 to 3 percent in recent decades (Boards of
Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds, 2009).
7war cohort decomposed into functional parts for clarity. Panels A and B depict possible
schedules of participation conditional on survival and of real per capita costs, where I have
simply assumed exponential growth of 3 and 2 percent per year respectively following the
end of the conﬂict, when the cohort is aged 25. Panel C shows a survivorship schedule for the
male 1920 birth cohort from Bell and Miller (2005), which declines gradually at ﬁrst, reaches
50 percent around age 75, and zero by age 100. Combining these three schedules produces
aggregate spending, shown in Panel D, which follows the same inverted U-shaped trajectory
found in actual data shown in Figure 1. The peak occurs at age 75 because the mortality rate
ﬁrst exceeds 5 percent at that age. If I were to combine Panels A and C, I would produce
a similarly shaped trajectory of aggregate participation with a peak occurring earlier than
is shown for utilization in Panel D. The fact that the historical peaks in spending and head
counts in Figure 1 and 2 roughly line up suggests that there may be non-monotonicities in
participation or per capita cost growth, neither of which have I attempted to capture in
Panels A and B.
These results suggest that a long-term perspective will be important for a complete
assessment of the costs of armed conﬂict. In the short run, a variety of factors appear to
keep the costs associated with service needs relatively low. But increases in aggregate beneﬁt
utilization through age that we see in the data, although they remain somewhat mysterious,
imply that costs are bound to rise in the long run before ultimately falling due to mortality.
The Scope and Deﬁnition of War Costs
It is useful to categorize war costs according to incidence in order to understand their mag-
nitude. The total costs of war comprise public costs or budgetary costs, which like disability
beneﬁts are paid to veterans by taxpayers via governments; social economic costs, to use a
term coined by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008), which are borne by individual veterans and their
households; and macroeconomic costs, which are spread over entire economies. They may
also include interest costs, the extra spending in the future required to put oﬀ the payment
8of costs that come due today. Public or budgetary costs, such as direct military spending
and veterans’ beneﬁts, are the most overt of these costs. Each of the other types of cost is
deserving of some discussion.
Economists believe that the cost of traumas can be gauged by measuring the willingness
to pay money to avoid them. Although this notion is not universally accepted,5 it has some
parallels in law in addition to economic theory. Juries award ﬁnancial penalties based on
pain and suﬀering using the same underlying principle: money makes people better oﬀ, so
it can compensate in at least some way for things that make them less well oﬀ, like injuries,
health conditions, and even death. Compensation for victims of terrorism and environmental
harms is also based in large part on that principle.
Part of the total compensation for an injury can be conceptualized as income replacement.
If a debilitating injury reduces or removes altogether the ability to work and earn wages,
one component of the cost of the injury is the present discounted value of foregone future
earnings. But an important insight is that such lost earnings typically represent only a
fraction of the total loss felt by an individual (Viscusi, 1993). Someone who loses a hand,
for example, experiences not only a reduction in workplace productivity that lowers wages,
but also a reduction in the quality of life that is altogether separate from and compounds
the dollar value of the earnings loss. If that individual could have paid a lump sum to avoid
the injury, its amount would equal the present value of lost earnings plus the cost of the
reduction in quality of life. The willingness to pay should in principle capture both.
A standard terminology in economics is that social costs comprise all costs tied to an
action or event, whether borne by public or private individuals, regardless of whether those
entities were direct parties to the action or not. The public cost is the portion of the social
cost paid by governments via borrowing or tax revenues that is frequently discussed. The
Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO), for example, is charged with estimating the federal
5Some view measuring the costs of injuries and other events in this way as potentially leading to socially
unjust outcomes. The revealed willingness to pay may arguably depend on the ability to pay, or income,
on the rationality of perceptions, on the availability of information, or on other factors that may not be
distributed in a socially just fashion across individuals.
9government’s portion of public costs. While in theory the public costs could meet or even
exceed social costs, studies have typically found that veterans’ compensation systems do not
fully compensate the social or total costs associated with service-related injuries (Wallsten
and Kosec, 2005; Bilmes and Stiglitz, 2006; Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008). As a result, the public
costs of war-related compensation for service-related injuries and deaths, which are the most
widely cited statistics, will understate the true social costs as they would be measured by
aggregated willingness to pay across those aﬄicted.
The diﬀerence between the public costs of treating and compensating injuries and fatal-
ities and their larger social costs is borne by injured veterans and their families, and it has
been termed the social economic cost by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008). The social economic
cost is an accounting residual, deﬁned as the willingness to pay to avoid an injury such as
losing a limb, minus all disability beneﬁts that partially compensate for the injury.6 This
concept is more complex than that of public costs, and due to the nature of the willingness
to pay, estimates tend to vary widely. Markets only implicitly price injuries, such as when
higher wages compensate workers who face higher injury risk, which is a standard source of
identiﬁcation in the literature (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). Even to the extent that markets
do this, it is not entirely clear whose well-being is priced. If individuals are altruistic and
make decisions based on the well-being of their families and households, then the willingness
to pay to avoid an injury should incorporate all adverse eﬀects on families and households
as well as on the individual. But the standard approach is to assume that willingness to
pay does not incorporate these spillover costs, which should instead be measured separately.
The larger social economic costs could then be deﬁned to include costs borne by families and
households who lose a member to death, illness, or divorce, for example, but because very
little is known about these costs, current estimates typically do not account for them.
A related concept of costs that are external to the individual are the macroeconomic costs.
6In calculating the social economic cost of an injury, any health care costs associated with the injury are
not subtracted from the willingness to pay because the latter is typically calculated holding wealth or income
ﬁxed. The implicit assumption is that health care treats but does not reverse the condition.
10These are associated with general equilibrium eﬀects of large-scale events. One example of a
war-related macroeconomic cost could be a reduction in the aggregate supply of U.S. human
capital if service were widespread such as via a draft. Other macroeconomic eﬀects could
derive from a diversion of saving toward war industries rather than privately productive
investment, reducing the private capital stock. A third example is that military action in
the Middle East typically reduces oil production and raises the price of oil, which dampens
global economic growth (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008). A more controversial macroeconomic
eﬀect of war is the ﬁscal stimulus associated with government spending.7
Another controversial category concerns interest costs, namely the extra spending in the
future required to put oﬀ the payment of costs that come due today. The federal government
has paid all of its current costs and run a budget surplus in only 12 of the 69 years since
1940; in others years it has borrowed funds and paid them back later. Borrowed costs are
indeed higher in nominal or real dollars when paid back in the future. But unless government
borrowing raises real interest rates, the present discounted value of costs, which takes real
interest rates into account in determining the time value of money, remains unchanged by
borrowing. As a result, some argue that interest costs do not belong in the calculation of
total costs (Orszag, 2008b).8
Because there are a variety of costs borne by diﬀerent groups over multiple time periods,
war cost estimates often diﬀer because forecasters have deﬁned the cost domain diﬀerently.
The common ground among forecasts tends to be the direct military spending associated
with warfare and occupation, which forms a good basis for comparison. But in many ways
7Absent any behavioral response from private spenders, government purchases raise GDP one-for-one.
Given a Keynesian marginal propensity to consume out of income, there would be an additional increase in
private spending. But Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) argue that modern economists believe war spending to be
detrimental on net, in a clear rebuke of Keynesian thinking. Barro (2009) believes that of all types of gov-
ernment spending, military spending is the least likely type to crowd out private investment or consumption,
but that even its net stimulative eﬀect is less than one-for-one. In contrast, the 2009 ﬁscal stimulus plan
was based on assumptions that the government spending multiplier was considerably greater than one.
8Gale and Orszag (2004) reveal that budget deﬁcits typically reduce national saving and raise interest
rates. Another reason why borrowing might matter is if it produces higher tax rates in the future, and thus
larger distortions, disincentives, and dead-weight losses, which tend to rise at an increasing rate with tax
rates.
11the forecasts of veterans’ costs are more revealing.
Estimates of War Costs in Iraq and Afghanistan
Extant cost estimates of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF) are typ-
ically presented in aggregate dollars, either undiscounted nominal sums or in present dis-
counted value. While relevant for ﬁscal planning, total dollars of costs do not reveal much
about the severity of the implicit burden. The ratio of aggregate costs to the nation’s income
or gross domestic product (GDP), which indexes its ability to pay, is a better measure of
net burden for the country. Similarly, the ratio of total costs to the size of the population
that pays them, whether all taxpayers in the case of public costs or the much smaller subset
of service members and families in the case of the social economic costs, measures the net
average burden on individuals. This section ﬁrst compares and contrasts estimates of aggre-
gate costs, focusing on the costs of injury and death. Then I discuss the components of costs
that are omitted from these studies. Finally I reassess aggregate costs in relative terms in
order to gauge the intensity of associated burdens.
Aggregate Costs
The ﬁrst widely publicized estimate of the cost of a war in Iraq was the $100 to $200 billion
suggested by Lawrence Lindsey, President George W. Bush’s chief economic adviser, in 2003
(Wallsten, 2006). As noted by Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006), the Bush Administration later
labeled that an overestimate, instead preferring ﬁgures in the range of $50 billion. By the end
of 2005, the total cost of the military operations in Iraq had exceeded $250 billion. By the
middle of 2007, the CBO estimated that $602 billion had been spent on military operations
and other activities in Iraq and Afghanistan since September of 2001 (Sunshine, 2007).
As recounted by Nordhaus (2002), Wallsten and Kosec (2005), and Wallsten (2006), sev-
eral government agencies and groups of economists predicted war costs prior to the invasion
12of Iraq. Many forecasts acknowledged the great uncertainties involved, typically by specify-
ing an array of scenarios with varying degrees of optimism about the outcome of the war.
History has generally proven the pessimistic scenarios to be more accurate.
Nordhaus (2002) estimated that the undiscounted sum of direct military and macroeco-
nomic costs could range between $99 billion and $1.9 trillion depending on the quality of
the war outcome. Other researchers diﬀered on the likely scope of war costs and whether
they would exceed the beneﬁts of a successful war. Writing in 2003, Davis, Murphy and
Topel (2009) argued it was possible that the beneﬁts of war, the foregone no-ﬂy-zone costs
and improved economic outcomes in Iraq, could exceed the costs. But they also presented
a wide range of possible cost scenarios that included many high-cost outcomes, the largest
registering $633 billion for U.S. military, humanitarian, and compensation costs combined.9
The top of Table 1, which lists all detailed war cost forecasts for easy comparison, depicts
the larger of Nordhaus’s two estimates alongside the scenario 6 speciﬁed by Davis, Murphy
and Topel, which most closely ﬁts reality ex post. Excepting macroeconomic costs and
impacts on oil markets, which the latter study omits, Nordhaus’s high estimate totals $755
billion, close to Davis, Murphy and Topel’s $633 billion. But Nordhaus did not include the
costs of death and disability, while Davis, Murphy and Topel followed the lead of Wallsten
and Kosec (2005) in estimating the costs borne by veterans and the federal government
through the VA. In their middle scenario, shown in the next row of Table 1, Wallsten and
Kosec expected military costs would reach $507 billion, or 84 percent of the total present
value of $603 billion, with the remaining $96 billion attributable to the costs of fatalities,
injuries, and lost wages. This is roughly comparable to the $105 billion in U.S. fatalities and
injuries forecast by Davis, Murphy and Topel; the latter used Wallsten and Kosec’s results
to inform their own analysis. There is controversy surrounding this cost component because
it is dependent on estimates of the costs of treating new types of combat-related injuries,
and on estimates of the economic harm associated with injuries and death.
9Their costliest scenario (7) included these costs plus discounted future costs associated with a return to
maintaining the prewar status quo with no-ﬂy zones.
13Costs of Injury and Death
The unique contribution of Wallsten and Kosec (2005) was to estimate the lifetime costs
associated with traumatic brain injury (TBI), which has been termed the signature injury
of OEF and OIF. They report that the present value of treating TBI over a lifetime could
range from $600,000 to $4.3 million, and their forecast assumes a value of about $2.2 million.
The costs associated with the 2,824 veterans estimated to have been diagnosed with TBI
before August 2005 reached $16 billion in present value.
Although the number of troops ever diagnosed with TBI has surely risen over time, the
Congressional Budget Oﬃce argued that these forecasts are too high for several reasons.
Goldberg (2007) states that Wallsten and Kosec overestimated both the numbers of diag-
nosed TBI’s and their severity. He cites 1,950 TBI’s diagnosed by December 2006, of which
two thirds were mild. Goldberg (2007) and Orszag (2008b) also question the assumed cost
per TBI. Wallsten and Kosec based their forecasts on the costs of severe head injuries suﬀered
in automobile crashes, in which no protective gear is worn.
In two working papers, Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006) and Bilmes (2007) provided new sets
of cost estimates, which are shown in the next rows of Table 1. Both studies forecast much
larger costs associated with death and injury, between $400 and $500 billion. Several years
later, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) forecast a total cost of $3 trillion in present value, $415
billion of which was the uncompensated social economic cost associated with injuries and
death. While Stiglitz and Bilmes used Wallsten and Kosec’s calculations in some cost areas,
their overall ﬁgures came out considerably larger, as shown toward the bottom of Table 1.
Roughly a factor of 10 separates their estimates of the combined public and social economic
costs of injuries and deaths.
Military operations were still ongoing during this period; indeed they intensiﬁed during
the troop surge conducted in Iraq during 2007, and this raised both direct military costs
and the costs associated with wounded veterans. But the CBO estimates (Sunshine, 2007;
Goldberg, 2007), which are similar to those of Wallsten and Kosec (2005), provided scenar-
14ios that incorporated the surge.10 Rather, the gap results from a combination of diﬀerent
assumptions about (1) the number of future veterans, which depends on current and future
operations; (2) rates of illness and disability, the propensity of veterans to seek treatment,
and the ability of the VA system to process them; (3) the costs of treatments or the amount
of disability rating and beneﬁts; and (4) growth in the cost of treatments.
Of these, the ﬁrst element is relatively trivial and depends on war developments and
policy. The second is important but also more uncertain, and new knowledge is gained
continually. The incidence and degree of TBI aﬄiction and its permanence are unknowns,
as are the ability of the VA to identify it and the propensity of veterans to ask VA to
do so. Compared to annual data on OEF and OIF veterans treated by VA prior to 2009
presented by Goldberg (2007), Bilmes (2007) assumed aggregate usage that was about 25
percent higher. A recent cost estimate provided by RAND (Tanielian and Jaycox, 2008),
shown near the bottom of Table 1, examines the cost of mental health trauma deriving from
PTSD, TBI, depression, and other related conditions. That estimate, $10.2 billion in public
and social economic costs over 2 years or $5.1 over 1 year, is diﬃcult to compare to the other
long-run cost estimates; but it is 5 to 10 times as large as the single-year cost estimates
of public disability and VA medical care cited by Sunshine (2007) and Goldberg (2007).
The diﬀerence could be due to prevalence estimates, assumptions about per capita costs,
assumptions about the life cycle of the diseases, or all of these.11
10Wallsten and Kosec (2005)’s estimate of $96 billion in VA beneﬁts plus social economic costs is in the
same ballpark as the total present value of public spending implied by oﬃcial CBO estimates. The CBO
produces 10-year forecasts, which I extended by extrapolation. I speciﬁed the same time horizon, 40 years,
and nominal discount rate, 4.5 percent, used by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008). The average age of OEF/OIF
veterans is about 29 (Institute of Medicine, 2010), and male cohort life tables forecast by the Social Security
Administration Bell and Miller (2005) suggest that their remaining life expectancy should be closer to 55
years, but I used 40 years in order to maintain consistency across estimates. The resulting extrapolation of
the CBO estimate is shown in Table 1. My results suggest that the two CBO estimates, Sunshine (2007)
and Goldberg (2007), diﬀer slightly but imply a total present value of public spending on VA disability
and medical care of around $60 billion, which is more than an order of magnitude below the $717 billion
estimated by Stiglitz and Bilmes.
11The RAND study collected a telephone sample of about 2,000 OEF and OIF veterans, Seal et al. (2009)
examined VA medical records of almost 300,000 veterans. Both studies found a high incidence of mental
health ailments. The RAND study, based on self-report, found that 30.7 percent has at least one out of three
conditions (TBI, depression, or PTSD). Seal et al. estimate that 36.9 percent had been diagnosed with at
least one of a slightly broader set of conditions (including PTSD, depressive disorders, alcohol use disorders,
15For long-term forecasts, the third and fourth assumptions play very critical roles. Stiglitz
and Bilmes assume that the average cost per OEF and OIF veteran in 2006 was roughly twice
as large as what the CBO assumes.12 Part of this is because in their “realistic-moderate”
forecast, Stiglitz and Bilmes use the average cost across all VA patients, not the average
across only OEF and OIF veterans in the VA. As CBO has pointed out (Orszag, 2008b),
veterans from earlier conﬂicts are older and thus more expensive because of the routine
costs of treating diseases associating with aging. Assuming OEF/OIF veterans cost the
same as Vietnam and older veterans will surely overstate current costs, but it is unclear
whether it also overstates future costs. Average OEF/OIF costs could increase quickly as
new knowledge about health conditions and treatments arrives.
Perhaps most importantly, Stiglitz and Bilmes assume that the real average cost of treat-
ments rises 3 percent each year, doubling about every 23 years. CBO forecasts are less clear
regarding this assumption, but the 10-year estimates under the high option presented by
Goldberg (2007) show an average annual growth rate in total real VA health spending on
OEF and OIF veterans of 2.2 percent. Because there will be rapid growth in the population
of such veterans, the implicit growth rate in real average costs must be much lower, probably
unrealistically low.13 To be sure, a 3 percent annual rate of growth in real average medical
costs is considerably faster growth than assumed for Medicare by its Boards of Trustees
(2009), who report that excess growth in health care costs has averaged 2 or 3 percent in
recent decades. But based in part on recommendations from technical review panels, they
currently forecast it to decline to 1.4 percentage points by 2033, to 0.8 by 2053, and 0.2 by
2083. I ﬁnd that compared to the assumptions of the Medicare Trustees, an assumption of
and drug use disorders). The prevalence of PTSD was 13.8 percent in the RAND study and 21.8 percent in
the VA data.
12Both Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) and CBO (Goldberg, 2007) use spending per capita in 2006 as their
benchmark. The former assume spending per OEF/OIF veteran will start at $5,765, the average VA treat-
ment cost across all veterans; the latter assumes it is $2,610, the actual VA health spending in 2006 per
OEF/OIF veteran. In their “best case” estimates, Stiglitz and Bilmes assume the number is $3,500, which
they chose “after consulting with physicians in the VA treating new veterans.”
13Bilmes (2007) estimated the OEF and OIF VA population would be growing at an average annual rate
of 11 percent over that period, which is actually below the comparable rate of 32 percent observed between
2005 and 2008 according to the CBO (Goldberg, 2007).
163 percent excess annual growth raises the present value of total VA health costs by almost a
factor of 2 over a window of 40 years.
Growth in average medical costs and growth in the patient population have the same
eﬀect on an actuarial forecast of total costs, and it appears that both are important for the
diﬀerences in forecasts. Assuming that CBO’s estimates of medical cost growth are similar to
those of the Medicare Trustees, then the factor of 10 separating Stiglitz and Bilmes’s estimate
from the CBO’s estimate of VA medical and disability costs may be roughly parceled into
(i) a factor of 2 separating the initial average health costs, (ii) another factor of 2 deriving
from faster growth in average costs, and (iii) a residual factor of 2.5 that must be subsumed
in diﬀerent estimates of the population of OEF/OIF veterans and their propensity to seek
and receive care, as well as any other factors.
Omitted Costs of Education and Adjustment
The estimates shown in Table 1 focus on costs associated with deployment and post-deployment
health and disability, which are arguably the most important. But there are at least two
other types of costs that are less frequently discussed. Education and retraining programs
for veterans and their families are costly to the government and to taxpayers, but they are
beneﬁcial to recipients and thus may not be commonly perceived as costs at all. At the
opposite extreme, there may be social, psychological, and economic costs borne and felt
acutely by families and communities who are adjusting to accelerated deployments, reduced
dwell times, and reentry following military service (Institute of Medicine, 2010). But these
costs are much less overt or clearly understood, and currently we can say very little about
them.
Educational beneﬁts, most notably the G.I. Bill, are a war-related cost to the government
but also a beneﬁcial investment in the human capital of veterans. Researchers view the
midcentury G.I. Bill as having vastly expanded the educational attainment of birth cohorts
with high rates of military service in World War II and Korea (Bound, 2002; Stanley, 2003).
17The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 expanded the G.I. Bill to cover
OEF and OIF veterans; that program went into eﬀect in August of 2009. In 2008, the CBO
estimated that the bill would cost $51.8 billion over 10 years (Orszag, 2008a). That is about
four times as large as the CBO’s “high option” 10-year forecast of VA medical and disability
spending (Goldberg, 2007).
According to statistics reported by the U.S. Department of Education (2009), the real
average costs of education have been rising by more than 2 percent per year during the past
decade. In other words, education costs are growing roughly as fast as medical costs. Working
to reduce educational costs is the relatively short life-cycle of usage per veteran; reentry
students typically ﬁnish within several years. The same is not the case with VA health care,
which is typically provided throughout the entire life of the veteran. Educational beneﬁts
may also improve force retention and should improve individual well-being by raising earnings
and improving health (Grossman, 2006). But educational beneﬁts are also a potentially
explosive source of cost growth because of wide eligibility and rapidly increasing costs of
tuition. The volatility of payments for veterans’ education subsidies is depicted in Figure 4,
which plots federal spending on several types of veterans’ payments as shares of GDP since
1940 and forecast to 2014. The G.I. Bill produced a massive surge in spending that reached
nearly 2.5 percent of GDP in 1950, ﬁve times its share after 1952.
The second component of costs that is less frequently discussed derives from the burdens
that may be placed on families and communities by accelerated and lengthened overseas de-
ployment, reduced dwell times between deployments, and reentry adjustments for returning
veterans and their families. As reported by the Institute of Medicine (2010), very little is
known yet about the conditions fostered by recent changes in military life brought on by
ongoing wartime commitments. The challenges faced by veterans and their families of adapt-
ing to social and economic conditions are also in a state of ﬂux, owing both to long-term
trends like the increase in female labor force participation and the rise in divorce rates, and
to short-term trends like the massive disruptions brought about by the recession of 2008.
18Costs in this category could derive from juvenile delinquency associated with the absence
of parental guidance, the trauma of divorce, domestic violence, and other family trauma.
Disruptions in communities that lose workers called up to National Guard or reserve units
may be costly as well. However, little is known about the incidence of these events and their
connections with wartime service, and less is known about their costs. Their omission is not
indicative of any judgment about their relative importance, but the state of knowledge is
poor enough to preclude even a guess about how large or small the costs might be. More
research is needed in these areas.
Relative Costs
The aggregate costs of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan remain unclear because the conﬂicts
are ongoing, the life cycle of costs is very long, and there is much uncertainty about current
and future costs. But even though our current knowledge may be imprecise, it is useful to
assess the magnitudes of costs relative to the ability to bear them.
In isolation, an amount like $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008) sounds like a very large
cost. Compared with the inﬂation-adjusted direct military costs of past wars, which are
shown in Table 2, $3 trillion is certainly large, surpassed only by the massive direct military
expenditures incurred during World War II, which amounted to almost $3.5 trillion in 2008
prices. But according to Table 1, direct military expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan
are likely to be more like $1 to $1.5 trillion, or perhaps half the level of World War II
spending but also at least twice the real direct cost of the Vietnam war. The rest of the
$3 trillion, if that ﬁgure is correct, may or may not be historically unprecedented. Without
comparable estimates of past public and social costs associated with injuries and deaths and
of macroeconomic costs, it is diﬃcult to tell. I assess historical costs of injury and death
in a companion study (Edwards, 2010), while Glick and Taylor (2010) estimates the cost of
lost trade in several wars in the last century. Both studies ﬁnd these components tend to be
large for historical conﬂicts.
19Costs of roughly the same magnitude as $3 trillion are neither widespread nor entirely
unique. The unfunded shortfall in Social Security is currently $5.3 trillion in present value
over 75 years (Board of Trustees, 2009), while Medicare’s unfunded shortfall is more than
twice as large at $13.4 trillion (Boards of Trustees, 2009). Measured relative to these un-
funded obligations, which are a combined $18.7 trillion, $3 trillion seems relatively small,
only about a sixth as much. The deﬁcit was $1.6 trillion in ﬁscal year 2009, and the national
debt held by the public rose to $7.9 trillion, or about 56 percent of the nation’s $14.1 trillion
GDP (Oﬃce of Management and Budget, 2009) and is projected to rise. As a percentage of
annual GDP, $3 trillion represents an addition of about 20 percentage points to the debt-
to-GDP ratio. But as a present value of the sum of GDP over 40 years, the total war cost
is only 0.4 percent.14 Like the actuarial balance measures of Social Security and Medicare,
this number roughly represents the required increase in the tax rate that would close the
ﬁscal gap over this period. By comparison, the needs of Social Security and Medicare loom
larger: 0.7 percentage point over 75 years for the former and 1.7 percentage points for the
latter.
Viewed relative to population, war costs again sound relatively high. If costs were ap-
portioned across 300 million U.S. residents, they would produce individual costs of $10,000
per person. This is large in an absolute sense, although it is not large relative to lifetime
income, current wealth, or other kinds of household debt per capita. But not all war-related
costs are spread equally across all taxpayers or citizens; many costs are more concentrated.
Of the costs itemized in Table 1, the $415 billion in social economic costs forecast by Stiglitz
and Bilmes (2008) will be borne entirely by the 1.8 million veterans they estimate will have
been discharged by 2017.15 On a per capita basis, the $415 billion in social economic costs
14I assume the real interest rate is 1.5 percent while the growth rate of real GDP is 2.9 percent. This
produces a total present value of GDP over 40 years of about $750 trillion.
15As described earlier, the social economic cost can be conceptualized as the uncompensated pain and
suﬀering and other costs associated with illness and death. It does not include the uncompensated costs
of warfare borne by veterans’ families and communities, such as may stem from divorce and other family
disharmony. If they could be measured, those costs would raise the bottom line.
20borne by 1.8 million OEF and OIF veterans is over $230,000 per veteran, a large amount.16
By comparison, the present value of family gross income may approach $2.5 million for these
veterans, implying that uncompensated war costs could represent about 10 percent of re-
maining lifetime wealth.17 If the social economic costs are borne only by the 40 percent of
OEF/OIF veterans who Stiglitz and Bilmes assume will claim any beneﬁts, the per capita
cost would rise by a factor of 2.5 to $575,000 per veteran, reaching 25 percent of lifetime
wealth.
If these estimates are correct, the challenge for policy may be to spread the burden of
these costs associated with pain and suﬀering from war wounds more widely. Such costs may
be large in aggregate, and they may be very large for individual veterans and their families,
but they are not very large for the nation as a whole. In a time of increased ﬁscal pressures
owing to the Great Recession and the aging of the Baby Boom generation, however, it may
be very diﬃcult to reallocate such burdens.
The Methods and Practice of Cost Forecasts
Ex Post Assessment of Iraq War Costs
As I have shown, one of the diﬃculties with comparing war cost forecasts is that they
often diﬀer in scope. Forecasts of veterans’ health beneﬁts also tend to diverge due to the
long life cycle of such costs and diﬀering assumptions about future cost growth. It is more
straightforward to compare forecasts of direct military spending, which has a much shorter
life span. But military spending is still subject to the large uncertainties associated with
16Removing the social economic costs of death, which are obviously not borne by living veterans, changes
the average burden to just over $200,000 per veteran. But it would be misleading to omit altogether the
costs of death, which to some extent must be felt by survivors.
17Real median family income of veterans is probably about $50,000 in 2009, a ﬁgure consistent with data
from the 2001 National Survey of Veterans for a similar age group inﬂated to 2009 levels. Real incomes
are likely to increase 1.5 percent per year over 55 remaining years of life from an average age of 28, with a
replacement rate of 50 percent after age 67. As before, I assume the nominal interest rate is 4.5 percent and
the real interest rate is 1.5 percent.
21the outcomes of warfare, which renders an ex post assessment of military cost forecasts
illuminating. How well have past forecasts managed to capture these uncertainties?
Figure 5 plots an array of forecasts of total direct military costs associated with Operation
Iraqi Freedom alongside the unfolding reality of total cumulative costs for each ﬁscal year
since 2003. The four sets of horizontal dashed lines depict projections of the ultimate total
present value of costs in 2003 dollars provided by Nordhaus (2002), Davis, Murphy and Topel
(2009), Wallsten and Kosec (2005), and Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008), starting from the year in
which they were originally made. Each set of forecasts includes at least two scenarios; one
includes eight and another three. The dark line rising monotonically upward is the actual
cumulative present value of direct military costs as of the listed year, based on data reported
by Belasco (2009) translated into 2003 dollars.
The graphic reveals that the forecasts of Nordhaus (2002) seem to have bracketed the
unfolding reality fairly well at least up to the present. The forecasts of Stiglitz and Bilmes
(2008) were higher than current reality but may ultimately be proved more accurate, given
the continued upward trend in the running total. Some forecasts conveyed large uncertainties
in direct military spending with the width of their intervals, while others did not. Nordhaus
(2002) and Davis, Murphy and Topel (2009) presented relatively wide uncertainty bands,
Wallsten and Kosec (2005) forecast a very narrow band, and Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008),
whose lower bound overlapped Nordhaus’s upper bound, provided a forecast band of inter-
mediate width. Part of this reduction in forecast uncertainty over time may have been due
to the increasing revelation that the war would not be short. In addition to being higher,
later forecasts are generally also narrower, reﬂecting less perceived uncertainty than in earlier
forecasts.
The record suggests that these war cost forecasts were able to at least roughly capture
the range of possible war outcomes. While it is now clear that the scenarios considered
by Davis, Murphy and Topel (2009) and especially Wallsten and Kosec (2005) were not
pessimistic enough, it is only in the case of the latter that the implied uncertainty band
22seems inappropriately narrow. The quality of oﬃcial government forecasts is somewhat less
clear. Sunshine (2007) presented scenarios for future spending on OEF and OIF combined
that appear to have a similar breadth. As Nordhaus (2002) recounts, earlier studies by CBO
and other governmental agencies before the wars began did not consider more pessimistic
scenarios with lengthy occupations. An open question is how and to what extent policy
makers have used available costs forecasts to guide their decisions.
Cost Forecasts through History
Nordhaus (2002) observes that governments seem to be historically prone to underestimating
the costs of war. Some political scientists and historians have argued that warfare itself is
the result of miscalculations or irrationality (Tuchman, 1984; Gartzke, 1999), so it may not
be surprising that ex ante cost estimates can be wrong. But Nordhaus suggests there may
political gains to forecasting low costs associated with war; consensus to go to war may be
more easily achieved if the perceived costs are low.
Many other kinds of government forecasts are also prone to error. In particular, Auerbach
(1999) shows revenue forecasts to be of relatively poor quality, overly inﬂuenced by short-
run developments like business cycles. Long-term projections of population and of large
transfer programs like Social Security and Medicare rely heavily on mortality forecasts,
which in the past have been consistently too pessimistic (Lee and Miller, 2001). In the
case of revenue forecasts, private estimates fare no better than government, suggesting the
problem is not rooted in politics or ineﬃciency as much as lack of knowledge. In the case
of mortality forecasts, errors seem to be the result of over-reliance on expert opinion about
what the future may hold, which often contrasts markedly with extrapolated trends. There
is much debate about long-term forecasts of Medicare and Social Security, with engagement
by academic researchers, actuaries, and the Trustees themselves.
Lessons from both types of forecasting are salient here. Forecasting is an inexact science,
and expert opinion might be unduly inﬂuenced by short-term developments. But while past
23trends are often informative, a complete approach should examine them alongside expert
opinion. In the present context of war costs, the trend toward reduced fatality rates in
warfare and thus greater prevalence of injury and need is a very good example of a long-
term trend that should be taken into account in forecasts. Likewise, the trend toward better
dissemination of knowledge about veterans’ programs, for example via the Internet, will
probably increase program participation in future periods more than a static model would
suggest.
As I have discussed, there is little agreement across forecasts concerning the costs of
treating and compensating injured veterans. But one commonality is that most forecasts
have speciﬁed an array of possible scenarios in an attempt to address the large uncertainties
surrounding the outcomes of armed conﬂict. At least in the case of academic forecasts,
the rough conﬁdence intervals implied by these scenarios were more or less wide enough to
capture the worst case scenario as it eventually unfolded. Given that war costs have turned
out to be relatively large, the natural questions that arise concern how the U.S. government
arrives at military decisions, the degree of risk aversion in its objective function, and how
policy advice concerning uncertain outcomes is perceived. These are all deserving topics for
further inquiry.
Current Forecasting Needs
The public and Congress receive forecasts of veterans’ programs infrequently under the cur-
rent system. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce releases oﬃcial projections most consistently.
CBO’s researchers sift through the VA’s reports to Oﬃce of Management and Budget in
order to specify many of their key assumptions. As of this writing, CBO has not publicly
updated its forecasts in two and a half years. CBO is charged by Congress with assessing a
far wider array of government programs than just those for veterans support, and it may not
have the personnel or funding to produce war cost forecasts more frequently. But with CBO
projections available only sporadically, it is diﬃcult to assess their quality or the quality of
24private forecasts, or to gain a clear picture of veterans’ current and future service needs.
The VA Actuary generates an annual actuarial forecast of limited scope for the disability
payment system that appears in the VA’s Performance and Accountability Report. But
there are no long-term forecasts of health care utilization for the VA population. To be sure,
the only other long-term forecasts of federal government spending programs are produced
by the Social Security Administration and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.
Those two agencies dwarf the VA in terms of service population and budget size; VA health
and disability beneﬁts are each roughly $40 billion per year, each around a tenth of the
size of Social Security or Medicare. But most states employ actuaries to produce long-term
forecasts of future spending on pensions and health care utilization owed to retired public
employees in police, ﬁre, and sometimes other agencies like education. Each of these state-
level programs are orders of magnitude smaller than the VA system, but long-term actuarial
forecasts are produced on an annual basis.18
Besides the diﬀerences in size, another salient diﬀerence between Social Security, Medi-
care, and VA beneﬁts has to do with the categorization of current and future obligation as
either mandatory or discretionary spending within the budget process. Social Security, most
of Medicare, and VA disability beneﬁts are mandatory spending categories, meaning that
unless Congress were to rewrite the basic laws governing those programs, it must fund the
spending each year. Veterans’ health beneﬁts are a discretionary part of the budget. The
issue that arises is not that discretionary programs are always underfunded; on the contrary,
Congress has consistently funded the VA through emergency spending bills. Rather, the
fact that veterans’ health spending is discretionary has meant that Congress can and typi-
cally does follow a wait-and-see approach rather than a more proactive stance as with Social
Security and Medicare, both of which have trust funds.
Given that the VA knows its service population the best, the VA has a comparative
18It is also true that states’ means of ﬁnancing current and future beneﬁts are generally more constrained
than those of the federal government, for example due to balanced budget amendments. This may help
explain why states frequently produce long-term forecasts of their retirement and pension systems while the
VA does not.
25advantage at producing long-term forecasts. If the VA Actuary were expanded with suﬃcient
funding and institutional support, it would best be able to produce long-term forecasts of
disability and health care needs that could inform policy. Recategorizing VA health beneﬁts
as mandatory spending could help this initiative.
Conclusion
The costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are large. The present value of war costs is in
the trillions rather than millions or billions of dollars. A large portion is attributable to direct
military operations, which are funded by general tax revenue and thus represent a burden
shared by many current and future U.S. taxpayers. The same is true of macroeconomic costs
and the costs of publicly funded veterans’ beneﬁts. The nation’s ability to pay those costs,
while not inﬁnite, also appears to be suﬃcient. The greater challenge in the case of these
costs, whose burden is spread widely, is knowing their size and timing with greater precision.
By contrast, the costs to veterans and their families may be very large. Unlike the need
covered by publicly funded beneﬁts, the remaining social economic costs associated with the
uncompensated harms of physical and psychological wounds of warfare, are borne solely by
veterans and their families. While these costs appear to be small in an absolute sense, they
are very large when apportioned out to each veteran who must bear them. Unreimbursed
social economic costs of $415 billion, as reported by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008), spread over
a pool of veterans that may reach 1.8 million works out to a average lifetime burden of more
than $230,000 per veteran. This is a cost approaching 10 percent of lifetime wealth, rising
to 25 percent if apportioned to injured veterans alone. If social economic costs were more
than an order of magnitude smaller at more like $25 billion, as reported by Wallsten and
Kosec (2005), the average lifetime cost borne by each veteran would be more like $14,000.
While small in a lifetime sense, this number is large as a lump sum.
The public costs are likely to rise with time as historical patterns of the life cycle of
26veterans’ costs imply. While the direct military costs of war are limited, except in the case
of indeﬁnite occupation, a possibility that seems remote, the life cycle of costs borne by and
associated with veterans themselves is long because their remaining life spans are typically
long. Service members now face much greater odds of survival from war wounds Institute of
Medicine (2010), but that also means that public support of veterans is also more long-lived.
Historically, the peaks in total beneﬁts and in head counts have lagged the end of hostilities
by 30 years or more, meaning the maximum eﬀect on annual budgets and on support systems
of the current conﬂicts might not be felt until 2040.
The record of academic war cost projections suggests current methods can capture the
vast uncertainties surrounding war outcomes and can provide useful insights for guiding
policy. Applying current techniques with greater frequency and transparency is thus likely
to yield useful results, given that war costs are large, they will rise over time, and some costs
are probably borne entirely by veterans and their families. That said, there are unresolved
questions surrounding war cost forecasts, such as how future veterans’ costs are likely to
unfold, and how the government assesses and utilizes war costs forecasts given their inherent
uncertainty. These are important questions for future eﬀorts to address.
Unfortunately, the current system of forecasting the needs of veterans and the costs of
meeting them may be underfunded and insuﬃcient. To be sure, long-term cost estimates
are highly uncertain and thus easily subject to controversy. Perhaps as a result, the domain
appears to have been largely ceded to academics. But in the cases of Social Security and
Medicare, which are also the subject of much interest and debate in scholarly and policy
circles, the Trustees and Actuaries of both systems are engaged in debate, informed about
controversial issues, and they more freely share opinions about the components of long-
range forecasts. Expanding the funding and mandate of the VA Actuary could be one way
to improve the quality of war costs forecasts. Recategorizing veterans’ health spending as
mandatory spending similar to Medicare could also help in such an eﬀort.
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31Table 1: War Cost Forecasts
Costs in Present value
Year of one year over 40 years
Source forecast Conﬂict Scope of costs (billions) (billions)
Nordhaus (2002) 2002 OIF Direct military spending 140
high case Occupation and peacekeeping 500
Reconstruction 105
Humanitarian assistance 10
Impact on oil markets 778
Macroeconomic impact 391
Total 1,924
Davis, Murphy, and Topel (2009) 2003 OIF Initial military operations 63
Scenario 6: Longer war, ten-year Occupation 410
occupation, major insurgency, U.S. fatalities and injuries 105
2 percent real discount rate Reconstruction aid and 56
Humanitarian assistance
Wallsten and Kosec (2005) 2005 OIF Military operations to date 212
middle scenario Future military operations 295
Public costs of VA disability 96
and medical care and social
economic costs of injuries
and deaths
Total 603
Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006) 2006 OIF Military operations to date 251
moderate scenario Future military operations 419
and defense






Bilmes (2007) 2007 OEF/OIF Public costs of VA disability 3.7 425
moderate scenario and medical care
Sunshine (2007) 2007 OEF/OIF Military operations to date 170 601
high option (scenario 2) with Future military operations 170 727*
12-month surge and defense
Public costs of VA disability 0.7 69*
and medical care
Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) 2007 OEF/OIF Military operations to date 646
realistic-moderate scenario Future military operations 1,317
and defense
Public costs of VA disability 717
and medical care
Social economic costs of 415
injuries and deaths
Macroeconomic 1,900
Total budgetary & social 3,095
Budgetary, social, and 4,995
macroeconomic w/o interest
Interest costs 816
Tanielian and Jaycox (2008) 2007 OEF/OIF Public and social economic 5.1
costs of mental health only
Goldberg (2007) high option 2008 OEF/OIF Public costs of VA disability 0.9 57*
with 12-month surge and medical care
Notes: Asterisks denotes authors calculations based on extrapolation assuming a constant growth rate
model to 2048 of the original CBO forecast to 2017, with a nominal discount rate of 4.5 percent.
32Table 2: Direct Military Costs Associated with Major U.S. Wars
Total direct cost
in billions of: Per capita Total cost
Current 2008 cost in as %
Conﬂict dollars dollars 2008 dollars of GDP
Revolutionary Wars (1775-1783) 0.1 2.6 525.2 63
War of 1812 (1812-1815) 0.09 1.3 141.0 13
Mexican War (1846-1848) 0.07 1.9 79.9 3
Civil War (1861-1865)
Union 3.2 44.8 1,594.5 84
Confederate 2.0 28.0 3,230.1 169
Combined 5.2 72.9 1,981.1 104
Spanish American War (1898) 0.4 11.3 129.3 3
World War I (1917-1918) 16.8 224.0 2,924.6 24
World War II (1941-1945) 285.4 3,403.2 23,956.3 130
Korea (1950-1953) 54.0 394.7 2,662.6 15
Vietnam (1964-1972) 111.0 580.8 2,589.7 12
First Gulf War (1990-1991) 61.0 89.4 359.6 1
Notes: The source is Nordhaus (2002), who cites U.S. Commerce Department, Historical Statistics of the
United States, Government Printing Oﬃce, 1975, vol. 2, series Y and Al Noﬁ, Statistical Summary: Americas
Major Wars at http://www.cwc.lsu.edu/cwc/other/stats/warcost.htm. Real costs are inﬂated to 2008 levels
using the GDP implicit price deﬂator
33Figure 1: Total spending on disability compensation and pensions by period of service






































































Notes: The data are real dollars of disability compensation and pensions for veterans by period of service,
where the nominal amounts are deﬂated by the CPI. These are totals for the veteran cohort, constructed as
the product of the number of veterans receiving beneﬁts, which includes living veterans receiving pensions
and deceased veterans whose dependents are receiving survivors’ beneﬁts, and the reported average spending
per veteran. The source is the Institute of Medicine (2010), which drew the data from the U.S. Census
Bureaus Statistical Abstracts of the United States from various years, which in turn cite Annual Reports of
the Secretary of Veterans Aﬀairs and VAs Annual Performance and Accountability Reports.
34Figure 2: Veterans on disability and pension payrolls by period of service





































































Notes: The underlying data are counts of both living veterans receiving disability pensions and deceased
veterans whose dependents are receiving survivors’ beneﬁts. For sources, see notes to Figure 1.
35Figure 3: The life cycle of publicly provided veterans’ beneﬁts































































Sources: Data in panels A and B are illustrative and reﬂect assumptions of steady annual growth in
participation and real per capita cost of 3 and 2 percent, respectively. Survivorship data in Panel C are for
the 1920 U.S. male birth cohort and are taken from Bell and Miller (2005). Panel D is the product of Panels
A, B, and C.
36Figure 4: Spending on veterans’ beneﬁts by category as shares of GDP
















































Sources: Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2010. The category labeled “All other payments”
includes educational beneﬁts, non-service connected pensions, insurance and burial beneﬁts, and any other
payments not otherwise itemized.
37Figure 5: Forecasts and realization of total direct military costs in Iraq












































































Davis, Murphy, and Topel (2009)
Wallsten and Kosec (2005)
Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008)
Actual
Sources: Nordhaus (2002), Davis, Murphy and Topel (2009), Wallsten and Kosec (2005), Stiglitz and
Bilmes (2008), and Belasco (2009). The data are forecasts (dashed lines) or the realization (thick black
line) of the total present value of direct military costs associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom. All data
are in 2003 dollars. Direct military costs consist of those associated with deployment, combat, occupation,
reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance. Forecasts of the total present value of costs are plotted as
straight lines extending forward from the year they were ﬁrst released. The actual cumulative present value
of direct military costs is constructed from nominal annual ﬂows reported by Belasco (2009) translated into
present values in 2003 dollars using the market yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury securities as reported in the
Federal Reserve’s H.15 release. The actual data are not a forecast; they are the running cumulative spending
totals, in 2003 present-value dollars, as of the date shown.
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